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Abstract: In addition to scope and scale embedding effects, temporal insensitivity of 
willingness to pay, also known as temporal embedding effect, has been a well known 
anomaly in eliciting willingness to pay for environmental quality change, especially over 
time. Stevens et al. (1997) defines two types of temporal embedding effects: strong 
insensitivity and weak insensitivity to payment schedule. This paper proposes an 
alternative definition of the temporal insensitivity. Temporal insensitivity implies that a 
subject in the survey responds consistently to value elicitation questions regardless of 
payment schemes. The sequential test tests the temporal insensitivity using the oyster reef 
restoration programs in Chesapeake Bay. Test results show that willingness to pay for the 
program is insensitive to the payment scheme or to the length of benefit stream of the 
project. Discount rates imbedded in cost stream vary significantly among the combination 
of project lengths and payment schemes. 
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In addition to scope and scale embedding effects, temporal insensitivity of 
willingness to pay, also known as temporal embedding effect, has been a well known 
anomaly in eliciting willingness to pay for environmental quality change, especially over 
time. Stevens et al. (1997) defines two types of temporal embedding effects: strong 
insensitivity and weak insensitivity to payment schedule. Strong insensitivity to payment 
schedule indicates the inability of respondents to differentiate between a series of 
payments and a lump sum payment on the project, and weak insensitivity implies 
inequality of willingness to pay’s between two temporally differentiated payment 
schemes but abnormally high implicit discount rates.  
Kahneman and Knetsch (1992) find evidence of strong insensitivity of median 
willingness to pay in the study of a toxic waste treatment facility. In their study, 
respondents showed the same lump sum median willingness to pay ( L WTP ) and annual 
willingness to pay ( t WTP) over a five-year payment scheme. On the other hand, a series 
of papers (Rowe et al. 1992, Stevens et al. 1997, Ibáñez and McConnell 2001, Bond et al. 
2002) has rejected strong insensitivity but found weak insensitivity of willingness to pay 
with high discount rates ranging from two digits to several thousand percent. In fact, 
relatively high implicit discount rates have been observed in experimental research as 
well (Harrison and Johnson, 2002; Harrison et al., 2002; Coller et al., 2002).  
Previous literature of temporal insensitivity, however, discovered their findings 
under too strict assumption on the underlying decision process of a subject. The strong 
assumption, specifically consistence and homoskedasticity of present value of willingness 
to pay over the payment schemes, can skip over comparison or identification problem. 
Furthermore, the definition of weak insensitivity is under debate since there is no 
consensus about an abnormally “high” discount rate.  
In this paper, we propose the concept of temporal willingness to pay and test the 
temporal consistence and invariance of willingness to pay. Chapter 2 describes the 
example study of environmental change and the concept of temporal insensitivity of 
willingness to pay. Chapter 3 provides the context of temporal willingness to pay and 
methodological development of estimation and test of temporal insensitivity. Chapter 4 
shows the application result and Chapter 5 briefly summarizes findings and conclusion.  2 
2. Temporal Insensitivity and Implicit Discount Rates 
2.1 Benefit Stream and Cost Stream in Contingent Valuation Study 
Environmental projects, by their nature, include temporal dimension of benefits 
and costs that may or may not be considered by researcher. To provide the context of 
temporal issue in the contingent valuation study, we start by describing a typical 
contingent valuation application for environmental change over time.  
In 2002, the Chesapeake Bay Foundation commissioned a study to measure the 
benefits from an oyster reef restoration project in Chesapeake Bay in Maryland (for 
details, see Haab et al. 2004). The oyster program has the hypothetical restoration target 
of 10,000 acres for oyster habitat and 1,000 acres for artificial reef. The survey context 
presented explicitly to respondents that the benefit stream from the ten-year (five-year) 
project would be increasing number of oysters in accordance with accumulation of reef 
restoration at the rate of 100 (200) acres and habitat preservation at the rate of 1,000 
(2,000) acres per year. Each restoration program employed one of three payment 
schemes: a one-time (lump sum) payment on next year’s state tax, annual payments over 
the life of the project, and permanent annual payments. Among six designs (2 project 
lengths and 3 payment schemes), one scenario was randomly offered to respondents. 
Thus, for example, respondents to the five-year project scenario with one-time payment 
were presented the following question
1, 
 
The restoration program is estimated to cost your household a total of $___. Your household 
would pay this as a special one time tax added to next year’s State income tax.  If an election 
were to be held today and the total cost to your household was $___ would you vote for 
or against the 5 year restoration program (Check one)? 
 
  I would vote for the program 
  I would vote against the program 
  I do not know whether I would vote for or against the program 
 
2.2 Reviews on Temporal Insensitivity 
Let the benefit that the respondent would get in each year be  t B , where t = 1, 2,…, 
B T , and the cost that he or she have to pay be  t C , where t = 1, 2,…,  C T . The series of 
benefit/cost pairs ( t B , t C ) fully describes the project. For facilitating the contingent 
                                                 
1 For the conservative reason, ‘I don’t know’ response is assumed to be ‘vote against’ response (Carson et 
al. 1998, Groothuis and Whitehead 1998). Thus, the response is of binary choice format. 3 
valuation study, respondents are assumed to have a well-defined value of  t B  that they can 
compare with the monetary value of costs
2. Annual willingness to pay constrained by the 
current period budget is the theoretical measurement of the well-defined value of the 
benefit stream, which are derived from either of the time-separable annual utility 
framework (Stevens et al. 1997) or the time-separable willingness to pay framework 
(Bond et al. 2002).  
Let 
A
t WTP  be the annual willingness to pay in t-th year, then the present value of 





t t PVWTP WTP r
− −
= =+ ∑      ( 1 )  
where r is the social discount rate. Most contingent valuation applications employed the 
terminal period of cost stream for aggregating discounted willingness to pay. By the same 





t t PVC C r
− −
= =+ ∑ .     (2) 
Now, we have the formal definition of temporal insensitivity of willingness to pay. 
Let 
L WTP  be the lump sum willingness to pay for a project (i.e. the present value of 
willingness to pay in the lump sum payment schedule). The strong insensitivity is defined 
by  12
L AA A
T WTP WTP WTP WTP === = L , i.e. an infinite discount rate. Strong insensitivity 
to payment schedule indicates the inability of respondents to differentiate between a 
series of payments and a lump sum payment on the project. The weak insensitivity is 
defined by the existence of 
L WTP PVWTP =  with abnormally high discount rate (Stevens 
et al. 1997). In their work, Stevens et al. (1997) estimated lump-sum willingness to pay 
and annual willingness to pay, and derived the implicit discount rate from 
L WTP PVWTP =  after the test of difference between lump-sum willingness to pay and 
annual willingness to pay. Bond et al. (2002) calculated the implicit discount rate with the 
assumption of consistent and homoskedastic willingness to pay across different payment 
schemes.  
                                                 
2 For convenience and simplicity, respondents are assumed to have well defined monetary value of benefit 
stream. In fact, well-defined range of values is enough for comparison and the value of benefit does not 
have to be a monetary unit. The decision is made by comparing the benefit and cost in terms of the same 
but any plausible unit.  4 
We have concerns in previous literature, especially about the consistence of 
willingness to pay across different payment schemes. For example, the difference of 
lump-sum willingness to pay and annual willingness to pay in Stevens et al. (1997) did 
not imply the equality of lump-sum willingness to pay and the present value of 
willingness to pay, which is also valid in Bond et al. (2002) when they estimated the 
implicit discount rate. Note that the benefit stream can be subjective due to individual 
confidence in the program, uncertainty of the future, different cognizance about the 
survey description, etc. The life of benefit stream may also be different in the 
respondent’s perception even though the contingent valuation survey describes explicitly 
the life of the project. If the willingness to pay varies with different payment schemes, 
there is a design effect on respondents’ response, which is defined as temporal 
inconsistence of willingness to pay. Without the consistence of willingness to pay, we 
cannot compare lump-sum willingness to pay and present value of willingness to pay.  
The second estimation problem is the heteroskedasticity across different payment 
schemes. In parametric estimation, random utility function or willingness to pay function 
assumes an additive error term with constant variance across different payment schemes. 
Since estimation models for binary choice normalize parameters by its standard deviation, 
this assumption leads miscalculation of implicit discount rate if violated.  
 
3. Consistence of Willingness To Pay and Sequential Test  
3.1 Theoretical Model 
For clear understanding temporal inconsistence and heteroskedasticity of 
willingness to pay, we introduce a theoretical model of deriving willingness to pay and 
estimating implicit discount rate. Let  t U  be the utility from the benefit  t B  at time t. Then, 
for the lump-sum payment scheme, the willingness to pay, i.e. the consumer surplus, for 
the environmental change is measured by the maximum payment equating two equations 
below, 
() ( ) ( ) ( )
23
12 3 4 ,, , , U xy U xy U xy U xy δδ δ + +++ L     (3) 
() ( ) ( ) ( )
23
11 1 22 33 44 ,, ,, ,, ,, U xB y M U xB y U xB y U xB y δδ δ −+ + + + L      (4) 5 
where equation (3) is the status quo utility stream and equation (4) is the utility stream 
with environmental change. For simplicity, we assume that income and other 
characteristic variables are constant over time
3.  
With the linearity of utility in income and constant income elasticity, the 








T WTP U U U U δδ δ
α
− =Δ + Δ + Δ + + Δ L      (5) 
where  ()( ) , tt t t UU x BU x Δ= −  and α is the income elasticity. By the same logic, the 
willingness to pay with the  C T -period annual payment scheme becomes 
()
1 1 2




T T AA A
TT WTP WTP WTP U U U U δδ δ δ δ
α
− − ++ + = Δ + Δ + Δ + + Δ LL .  (6) 
Cleary, the present value of willingness to pay, the left-hand side of equation (5) and (6), 
is discounted up to the life of cost stream and the corresponding benefit stream named by 
the present value of utility difference, the right-hand side of equation (5) and (6), is the 
one discounted up to the life of benefit stream.  
The consistence of willingness to pay comes from the identical expression of the 
present value of utility difference. However, the consistence should be tested before 
deriving the implicit discount rate and concluding temporal insensitivity since the 
inequality of 
L WTP  and 
A
t WTP  does not imply the equality of the present value of utility 
differences. Previous framework of willingness to pay ( tt t WTP ε ′ = + x β ) cannot identify 
the present value of willingness to pay due to unknown discount factor, which makes it 
impossible to test the consistence of willingness to pay. Random utility function 
framework ( tt t U ε ′ Δ= + x β ) also has the complicate problem because the present value of 
utility difference is discounted up to the life of benefit stream but the present value of 
cost is the discounted sum up to terminal period of costs. 
In this paper, we directly specifies the present value of utility difference in the 
right-hand side of equation (5) or (6) as a function of the set of full benefit stream and 
                                                 
3 The random utility at each period varies depending on the individually perceived benefit stream and time-
evolving characteristics of respondents. Although respondents are assumed to have constant covariates, 
linear additive specification of the model requires strong assumptions about the temporal properties of the 
error terms. 6 
current individual specific covariates. The value of the benefit stream, which we name 















− ≡Δ + Δ + Δ + + Δ
=+
L
     ( 7 )  
where  { }
B T B B B ,..., , 2 1 = π  is the benefit stream of the environmental project. The error 
term,  i ε , may be conditional on the project type and payment schemes. Instead of 
calculating the present value of annual willingness to pay’s stream, temporal willingness 
to pay assumes that respondents construct the willingness to pay from the view of the 
entire benefit stream. This may be a reasonable and realistic valuation structure of how 
individual respondent think of an environmental project proposed in a survey. Since 
temporal willingness to pay is a lump-sum value that an individual may have at the time 
of survey, temporal willingness to pay does not require the researcher to sum the 
discounted errors across time or impose restrictions on the temporal relation of multi-
period error terms
4. In addition, temporal willingness to pay formulation is flexible in the 
functional form of the systematic component.  
Contrary to previous literature, we define consistence and homoskedasticity of 
willingness to pay across payment schemes by temporal insensitivity of willingness to 
pay. From the temporal willingness to pay, the temporal consistence of willingness to pay 
is defined by 
lk TWTP TWTP =       ( 8 )  
where l and k represent different payment scheme. Temporal insensitivity of willingness 
to pay indicates that respondents have a consistent valuing mechanism that is not 
influenced by outside factors such as the payment scheme. 
 
3.2 Choice Probability and Estimation Model 
Respondents vote for the proposed project in contingent valuation study when the 
temporal willingness to pay is greater than the value of the cost stream for a project that 
                                                 
4 Temporal willingness to pay may be time-dependent in the sense that it can vary depending on the timing 
of the survey. However, Carson et al. (1997) show that CV estimates exhibited no significant sensitivity to 
the timing of interviews. 7 
is typically defined by the present value. With the linear model specification for the 
temporal willingness to pay and the functional assumption of the error term, the 
conditional probability that a respondent will vote for a program k given the payment 
version j is defined by 





jj j t CC r φ
−−
= =+ ∑ , the discount factor is  1 1 φ =  for a lump sum payment 






=+ −+ for annual payment over  C T  years (j = 2), and 
() 3 1/ rr φ =+  for perpetual payment (j = 3) when the discount rate is positive. The 
probability of vote against is defined as the complement to the probability of vote for. 
Generally, the variance of the error term is conditional on the project version (k) and 
payment scheme (j).  
When temporal willingness to pay is consistent but heteroskedastic across 
different payment schemes, we can estimate the model using dummies for cost variable, 
which is named by rescaled model. The rescale factor is the variance of one sub-sample 
(e.g. lump-sum payment) and the model estimates the relative variances of the other 
groups (e.g. annual payment). The positive standard deviation is defined by 
() exp j j d σσ λ ′ = , where σ is the standard error of lump-sum payment scheme. If  0 λ = , 
i.e. homoskedastic error term, then we can estimate the model simply by combining data 
without rescale factor.  
 
3.3 Sequential Test for the Temporal Insensitivity  
A sequential test proposed by Swait and Louviere (1993) for combining data from 
different data sources provides a context for testing consistency and homoskedasticity of 
temporal willingness to pay
5. The null hypothesis of the sequential test for consistence 








= ⎨ ⎬ = ⎩⎭
      ( 1 0 )  
                                                 
5 Haab et al. (1999) employed the sequential test in the contingent valuation study and found that correcting 
heteroskedasticity provided statistically consistent willingness to pay under real and hypothetical formats. 8 
where β  is the parameter set of the temporal willingness to pay function, and l and m 
indicate payment schemes. The composite hypothesis tests the consistence of temporal 
willingness to pay ( { } 0
A
lm H β β ==) without restriction on variances across payment 
schemes in the first stage. The model under the null hypothesis is rescaled model. 
Rejection of the first hypothesis indicates that the value of the environmental project 
varies depending on the payment scheme.   
Conditional on the failure to reject the first hypothesis, the second step is to test 
homoskedasticity across payment schemes ( { } 0
B
lm H σ σ == ). The unrestricted model in 
the second stage is the scaled model in the first stage. The restricted model in the second 
stage is the pooled model stacking all samples across payment schemes with equal 
parameters in temporal willingness to pay and dummies for payment scheme. 
 
3.4 Implicit Discount Rates from the Consistent Willingness To Pay 
If both stages of the sequential test fail to be rejected, the implicit discount rate is 
derived simply from pooled data across payment schemes. Let  j φ %  be the normalized 
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%      ( 1 1 )  
when we have lump-sum and annual payment schemes. With lump-sum payment and 










%% .      (12) 
If the first hypothesis fails to be rejected but the second hypothesis is rejected, the 
implied discount rate is derived from rescaled model, 
() ()
1,2 2









⎡ ⎤ ⎛⎞ + ⎢ ⎥ =− ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎢ ⎥ + ⎝⎠ ⎣ ⎦
%
%      (13) 














%      ( 1 4 )  
for lump-sum and perpetual-type payment schemes. Note that temporal willingness to 
pay is still time-consistent in spite of the heteroskedastic error term. 
 
4. An Application to Oyster Reef Restoration Program 
To test the temporal sensitivity of willingness to pay and to estimate implicit 
discount rate, we apply the temporal willingness to pay and sequential test to the oyster 
reef restoration project in the Chesapeake Bay. As described before, the mail survey 
consisted of a split-sample design with two temporal versions of the hypothetical project 
(A for the five-year project and B for the ten-year project) and three types of payment 
scheme (1 for lump-sum payment, 2 for annual payment, and 3 for perpetual type). The 
estimation model assumed a normal distribution for the error term.  
Table 1 shows estimation results for the five-year project. FEE1, FEE2A and 
FEE3 represent payment vectors for one-time, annual payment for five years and 
perpetuity-type payment, respectively. The first three columns of Table 1 exhibit the 
estimation result for individual payment scheme. The other columns show the result of 
rescaled and pooled models for several combinations of payment schemes. Temporal 
willingness to pay for five-year project ranged US$263~277. Table 2 provides test 
statistics for the sequential test on the five-year project. With 95% confidence, LR test 
failed to reject the consistence and heteroskedasticity of temporal willingness to pay of 
five-year project.   
 
[Table 1~2 located here] 
 
Table 3 and Table 4 also provide estimation results for the data pooled over five 
and ten-year restoration programs
6. The expected temporal of willingness to pays were 
$216~234 for five-year project and $181~198 for ten-year project in combined data. 
Table 3, however, shows that the temporal willingness to pay for the ten-year project is 
                                                 
6 We assumed consistence and homoskedasticity of temporal willingness to pay of different projects. Thus, 
the difference between five- and ten-year projects is estimated by the dummy for the project version. 10 
statistically indistinguishable from that of the five-year project. Indifference of temporal 
willingness to pay across project versions implies that respondents may evaluate the 
project based on the final status of the environment but do not care how fast the project is 
implemented. Table 4 demonstrates that temporal willingness to pay for the oyster reef 
program is consistent except one case of combining lump-sum payment and perpetuity-
type payment schemes. The rejection of hypothesis may be due to problematic features of 
data violating monotonic probability (Cooper and Loomis 1992, Kanninen, 1995). Except 
the case of rejecting the first stage hypothesis, for which the second stage test was not 
necessary, the sequential test could not reject the homoskedastic error terms across 
payment schemes. 
 
[Table 3~4 located here] 
 
Test results of oyster reef restoration program support that temporal willingness to 
pay for the oyster reef programs was insensitive, i.e. consistent and homoskedastic, to the 
payment scheme provided by researcher. Based on the sequential test results, Table 5 
shows the implicit discount rate from parameter estimates of payment. Implicit discount 
rates ranged from 20% to 130%. Estimated discount rates were still relatively high but 
much lower than previous studies. Similar to hyperbolic discounting (e.g., see Cropper 
and Laibson 1999), the short term discount rate (or near-term discount rate,  1A r ) was 
larger than the long term discount rate (or distant-term discount rate,  13 r ) for the five-year 
project only.  
 
 [Table 5 located here] 
 
7. Conclusions  
In spite of the simple concept of temporal insensitivity of willingness to pay, 
previous studies derived the temporal insensitivity and implicit discount rate under 
restrictive assumption that the present value of willingness to pay is identical across 
different payment schemes. However, identification of present value of willingness to 
pay and estimation of the discount rate from different payment schemes rely critically on 11 
the consistent and homoskedastic present value of willingness to pay in payment context. 
Especially, inconsistence present value of willingness to pay leads to inability of deciding 
temporal insensitivity. 
In this paper, we constructed the model of temporal willingness to pay and 
redefined the temporal insensitivity by consistence and homoskedasticity of temporal 
willingness to pay. The temporal insensitivity of willingness to pay implies the consistent 
valuing behavior of respondents with different payment schemes. Using the sequential 
test, we tested the consistence and homoskedasticity of the temporal willingness to pay 
for oyster reef programs in Chesapeake Bay. The test results showed that the temporal 
willingness to pay for the project was statistically identical across different payment types. 
In holding the payment scheme constant, however, temporal willingness to pay did not 
vary significantly across project versions. Homoskedasticity of the error distribution 
across payment schemes supported the use of pooled data over payment schemes to 
derive implicit discount rates. Estimated discount rates were relatively high but lower 
than that of previous studies. Implicit discount rates varied significantly across payment 
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Table 1: Estimation Results for Five-Year Project 
  Split Sample  1+2+3 1+3  1+2 
A1 A2 A3  Scaled  Pooled Scaled  Pooled  Scaled  Pooled 






0.2993      
(0.8034) 
0.4940      
(0.6379) 
-0.3034     
(0.9232) 
-0.0230     
(0.6874) 
-0.0082     
(0.6664) 
0.3011      
(0.7991) 








-0.2759*    
(0.1053) 
-0.4685*    
(0.1732) 
-0.3510*    
(0.1384) 
-0.4227*    
(0.1564) 
-0.3031*    
(0.1267) 






0.0734      
(0.0848) 
0.0355      
(0.0628) 
0.1196      
(0.0977) 
0.0605     
(0.0687) 
0.1247      
(0.1069) 
0.0775      
(0.0983) 






0.2607      
(0.2124) 
0.2028      
(0.1684) 
0.2163      
(0.2481) 
0.1795      
(0.2059) 
0.2597      
(0.2419) 
0.2585      
(0.2038) 






0.0229*     
(0.0080) 
0.0140*     
(0.0062) 
0.0282*     
(0.0093 ) 
0.0164*     
(0.0070) 
0.0342*     
(0.0095) 
0.0254*     
(0.0086) 






-0.0114     
(0.0393) 
-0.0100     
(0.0317) 
0.0097      
(0.0449) 
0.0224      
(0.0358) 
-0.0421     
(0.0390) 
-0.0458     
(0.0375) 
FEE1  0.0033* 
(0.0015)  — —  0.0041*     
(0.0012) 
0.0032*     
(0.0010) 
0.0041*     
(0.0014) 
0.0034*     
(0.0012) 
0.0037*     
(0.0013) 
0.0029*     
(0.0012) 
FEE2A  —  0.0059
(0.0042)  —  0.0063      
(0.0042) 
0.0064*     
(0.0029)  — —  0.0049      
(0.0045) 
0.0058      
(0.0032) 
FEE3  — —  0.0152*
(0.0072) 
0.0108      
(0.0065) 
0.0103*     
(0.0046) 
0.0092      
(0.0076) 
0.0112*     
(0.0052)  — — 
Scale Factors — — —  0.4645  — — —  0.4850  — 
      0.4266  —  0.5620  —  —  — 
N  101  83  73  257  174  184  
Mean ln(L)  -0.5635 -0.5852 -0.5566 -0.5992 -0.6015 -0.5900 -0.5930 -0.5913 -0.5951 
* significant at 95% confidence level. 
SEX is a dummy variable that is one for female. HS, AGE and EDUC are the size of household, age and education variables. RE is an ordinal variable for ranking 
the role of oysters among food, economy, environment and fish habitat. RE = 1 represents that respondent thinks environment is the most important role oysters 
play in the Chesapeake Bay.  
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Table 3: Estimation Results for Five and Ten-Year Projects 
  Split Sample  1+2+3 1+3  1+2 
AB1 AB2 AB3  Scaled  Pooled Scaled  Pooled  Scaled  Pooled 




1.1250      
(0.8959) 
-0.0422     
(0.6104) 
0.2748      
(0.4772) 
-0.5469     
(0.7104) 
-0.0615     
(0.5691) 
-0.3877     
(0.6948) 
-0.0870     
(0.5859) 
  0.2757      
(0.1936) 
-0.0821     
(0.4350) 
-0.0198     
(0.2183) 
0.1686      
(0.1640) 
0.1038      
(0.1336) 
0.2127      
(0.1749) 
0.1361      
(0.1419) 
0.2264      
(0.1841) 
0.1904      
(0.1714) 
RE  -0.2667*    
(0.1327) 
-0.1177     
(0.1454) 
-0.1781     
(0.1320) 
-0.2293*    
(0.0999) 
-0.1595*    
(0.0760) 
-0.2361*    
(0.1160) 
-0.1632     
(0.0903) 
-0.2522*    
(0.1132) 
-0.1901*    
(0.0950) 
HS  0.0421      
(0.0812) 
-0.1169     
(0.0977) 
-0.0620     
(0.0678) 
-0.0353     
(0.0601) 
-0.0426     
(0.0447) 
-0.0037     
(0.0684) 
-0.0300     
(0.0508) 
-0.0074     
(0.0717) 
-0.0179     
(0.0615) 
SEX  0.0567      
(0.1992) 
0.1954      
(0.2202) 
-0.3929     
(0.2289) 
0.0324      
(0.1541) 
-0.0192     
(0.1184) 
-0.0195     
(0.1802) 
-0.0911     
(0.1446) 
0.1220      
(0.1700) 
0.0960      
(0.1431) 
AGE  0.0316*  
(0.0077) 
0.0004      
(0.0086) 
-0.0057     
(0.0077) 
0.0182*     
(0.0057) 
0.0102*     
(0.0043) 
0.0231*     
(0.0066) 
0.0134*     
(0.0051) 
0.0248*     
(0.0066) 
0.0178*     
(0.0056) 
EDUC  0.0351      
(0.0374) 
-0.0068     
(0.0393) 
0.0426      
(0.0419) 
0.0369      
(0.0287) 
0.0251      
(0.0222) 
0.0468      
(0.0338 ) 
0.0376      
(0.0272) 
0.0270      
(0.0319) 
0.0166      
(0.0265) 
FEE1  0.0048*  
(0.0011)  — —  0.0053*     
(0.0009) 
0.0041*     
(0.0008) 
0.0051*     
(0.0010) 
0.0043*     
(0.0009) 
0.0051*     
(0.0010) 
0.0042*     
(0.0008) 
FEE2A  —  0.0059      
(0.0041)  —  0.0082*     
(0.0040) 
0.0072*     
(0.0027)  — —  0.0081*     
(0.0041) 
0.0081*     
(0.0029) 
FEE2B  —  0.0096      
(0.0059)  —  0.0090      
(0.0052) 
0.0084*     
(0.0035)  — —  0.0079      
(0.0054) 
0.0082*     
(0.0039) 
FEE3  — —  0.0068      
(0.0048) 
0.0063      
(0.0049) 
0.0076*     
(0.0032) 
0.0035      
(0.0057) 
0.0077*     
(0.0036)  — — 
Scale Factors     0.4744  —  —  —  0.4750  — 
      0.5495  —  0.6813  —  —  — 
N  202  165  152  519  354  367  
Mean ln(L)  -0.5902 -0.6007 -0.5865 -0.6096 -0.6115 -0.6080 -0.6117 -0.6030 -0.6064 
* significant at 95% confidence level. 
FIVE is a dummy indicator that equals one if individual i receives the five-year restoration plan and zero otherwise.   16
Table 2: Consistence and Homoskedasticity of TWTP (Five-Year Project) 
  1+2+3  1+3  1+2 
LR1  15.75 10.23 6.61 
LR2  1.16 1.02 1.43 
 
Table 4: Consistence and Homoskedasticity of TWTP (Five and Ten-Year Projects) 
  1+2+3  1+3  1+2 
LR1  17.84 13.75
* 5.95 
LR2  1.93 — 2.49 
* Rejected with 90% confidence. 
 
 
Table 5: Implicit Discount Rates 
  1+2+3  1+3  1+2 
Five-Year Project     
†r13  0.46 0.45  — 
‡r1A  0.94 —  0.98
* 
§r3A  0.22 —  — 
Five and Ten-Year Projects 
†r13  1.20 —  — 
‡r1A  1.29 — 1.02 
‡r1B  0.96 — 1.05 
§r3A  0.87 —  — 
§r3B  N/A —  — 
††rAB  0.43 — 1.31 
N/A indicates that coefficient of Perpetuity is less than that of other payment schedule. 
* One of coefficients of FEE is not significantly different from zero. 
† Calculated using coefficients of one time and perpetuity in pooled data.  
‡ Calculated using coefficients of one time and annual in pooled data. 
§ Calculated using coefficients of annual and perpetuity in pooled data. 
†† Calculated using coefficients of 5 and 10 year annual payments in pooled data. 
 